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INTRODUCTION
Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State
1
High Courts and Their Judges (Judicial Evaluations), by Professors
Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner is an important effort to
create and apply an objective methodology for evaluating the relative
quality of state supreme courts. The article follows a previous work
by Professors Choi and Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court
Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance (Choosing the
2
Next Supreme Court Justice), which employed a similar methodology
3
to evaluate the quality of federal appeals court judges.

Copyright © 2009 by Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman, and William P. Marshall.
† Professor of Law, UNC Chapel Hill, School of Law.
†† Associate Professor Law, UNC Chapel Hill, School of Law.
††† Kenan Professor Law, UNC Chapel Hill, School of Law.
1. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L. J. 1313 (2009).
2. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi &
Gulati, Choosing the Next]; see also Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92
CAL. L. REV. 299, 299–304 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?]
(proposing a system to evaluate federal judges).
3. For additional perspectives on judicial performance by Professors Choi, Gulati, and
Posner, see generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 (2005) (examining the background reasons for Judge
Posner’s high performance on rankings); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Essay, Ranking
Judges According to Citation Bias (As a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279
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Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner consistently advance the
4
theme that judicial rankings are here to stay. They contend that it is
important to develop an objectively neutral rankings system for two
reasons. First, an objective rankings system will offer significant
insights into judicial performance precisely because it is transparent
and replicable. Second, an objectively neutral methodology will
counter other evaluation systems that are more designed to reflect the
agendas of the evaluators than the quality of the judges studied.
We generally agree with Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner with
respect to these central assertions. Judicial rankings, for better or
worse, are not going away. Therefore, there is a strong need to
develop meaningful and appropriate measures for evaluation. We
also agree with the authors that developing objective criteria, if
possible, can unmask and refute the efforts of interest groups and
politicians to manipulate standards to further their own agendas.
The Choi, Gulati, and Posner approach is straightforward: (1)
identify attributes of judicial quality that are value neutral and
uncontestable, (2) find objectively measurable proxies that correlate
with those attributes, and (3) rank state courts according to the
proxies. The judicial attributes Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner
select are productivity, influence, and independence. The measurable
proxies are the number of opinions written by state courts, the
amount of out-of-state citations to those opinions, and instances of
disagreement among judges of the same political stripe. The study
suggests that to the extent that these proxies measure uncontestable
attributes of good judges and good courts, the rankings should reflect
relative judicial quality. Equally important, the rankings should
motivate judges and courts to improve their ranking by improving
their performance with respect to the underlying attributes.
That said, we have a number of concerns with the authors’
approach. To initially illustrate these concerns, consider the following
example. Suppose one wants to rank seafood restaurants.
Convenience is at least one important attribute in a restaurant, and
one possible proxy for convenience might be the distance of the
seafood place from the closest highway exit ramp. One might

(2007) (proposing a ranking system to make judicial bias more transparent); Stephen J. Choi &
G. Mitu Gulati, Essay, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We Care?), 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1077, 1079–96 (2005) (discussing the desirability of addressing issues of authorship
and delegation in federal court opinions).
4. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1364.
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therefore develop a restaurant quality index based on the ramp-toentrance distance in which restaurants closer to a ramp are ranked
higher than those farther away. But how effective would this ranking
actually be in determining restaurant quality?
First, the ranking on its own provides little meaningful
information if convenience is much less important to customers than
other attributes. It tells nothing, for example, about the quality of the
food, the friendliness of the service, or the cleanliness of the facility.
Second, if the proxy—ramp-to-entrance—is a small part of what it
means to be convenient, the ranking does not even tell one much
about convenience. Customers, after all, might find larger parking lots
to be of more convenience than highway proximity. Finally, because a
ranking encourages its subjects to take actions to increase their
scores, this convenience ranking might lead a restaurant to move
closer to a highway rather than take more important actions such as
improving the quality of its food, hiring friendlier employees, working
on its cleanliness, or increasing the size of its parking lot.
These same concerns come into play in the Choi, Gulati, and
Posner study. Similar to the choice of convenience in the restaurant
ranking described above, we strongly suspect that the attributes that
the authors select in Judicial Rankings constitute relatively minor
aspects of judicial quality. Those who care about state supreme courts
may not be all that concerned about productivity, influence, or
independence. Rather, observers may care more about whether
judges have a particular ideology or judicial philosophy, whether they
vote certain ways in hot button cases, whether they are fair, whether
they present their legal opinions clearly and address opposing
arguments, whether they possess a sound judicial temperament,
whether they have unquestioned integrity, whether they treat lawyers
respectfully, and whether they have outstanding reputations as jurists
in their communities. These factors (with the exception of ideology
and voting patterns) are undoubtedly hard, perhaps impossible, to
quantify. And many of these factors, unlike the ones relied on by
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, cannot be culled from Westlaw
or Lexis. Nonetheless, in deciding what is a high-quality court, the
Choi, Gulati, and Posner study—and the presumption it generates—
elevates measurable over nonmeasurable attributes without regard to
5
their relative importance.
5. The authors’ response to these concerns is that the presumptive marker of judicial
quality created by the ranking encourages parties to convey other useful information in an effort
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Second, even if judicial productivity, influence, and
independence are central to evaluating judicial quality, it is not at all
clear that the authors’ methodology accurately captures performance
in these areas. That is to say, the correlation between the proxy and
the attribute might not be that high. Does the number of published
opinions, for example, really reflect judicial productivity? Or are
there other more important factors involved, such as the total number
of cases reviewed, the time a court takes between hearing and
resolving a matter, or the effort the court devotes to judicial
administration and supervision? If so, then, the single proxy they have
chosen does not offer much more information about judicial
productivity than distance from the highway offers about the
convenience of restaurants in a world in which people care more
about parking or hours of operation.
Third, in the same way that we are wary of a restaurant rankings
system that only encourages restaurants to move closer to a highway,
so are we concerned with the incentives for judicial behavior created
by the Choi, Gulati, and Posner rankings. Evaluation systems
encourage their subjects to engage in activity to improve their
6
rankings. Indeed, rankings, as will be discussed, are beneficial when
they encourage aspects of judicial behavior that should be rewarded
7
and penalize aspects of judicial behavior that should be discouraged.
But one must be confident in the correlation between the proxy and
the attribute for the ranking to serve a salutary purpose. It is not clear
that motivating judges to write more opinions, to work to have their
opinions more frequently cited, or to disagree with judges of the same
political party would increase the overall quality of state courts—
particularly when those actions may require the judges to forego
other activities that may be more important to the administration of
8
justice. For example, judges striving to improve their productivity
to combat the presumption. But, as we will discuss infra Part II.B, that will be hard to do. A
seafood restaurant, for example, grappling with a low convenience ranking would have to post
flyers about the quality of the fish or the ambience of its dining room. These unverifiable claims
about immeasurable quality attributes look self-serving and will be unlikely to ever dislodge the
initial ranking presumption.
6. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 630 (2000) (discussing the role of reputation in
influencing judicial behavior).
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. The authors readily concede this point. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1318 (citing
Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 769, 778
(1975)).
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score by writing more opinions might shirk on other productive
responsibilities such as court administration, careful consideration of
the merits of each case, or a close reading of the trial record.
We therefore raise the possibility that the Choi, Gulati, and
Posner study may serve to weaken rather than improve judicial
performance. Again, we do not suggest that rankings systems are
necessarily bad because they may prospectively affect judicial
behavior. The key, however, is creating a metric that leads to
beneficial results, and we are concerned that the particular criteria
used in Judicial Evaluations are not so finely calibrated.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the threshold
question of whether ranking state supreme courts is valuable.
Assuming that there is value in the project, Part II looks at alternative
measures for evaluating the performance of state courts, juxtaposing
those measures with the indices of productivity, influence, and
independence used by Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner. Part III
examines the Choi, Gulati, and Posner study in detail. It first
questions whether, in creating a presumptive marker of judicial
quality, the authors miss something by focusing on productivity,
influence, and independence. Part III then discusses some of the
methodological problems with the selected proxies. Part IV suggests
an alternative lens of judicial evaluation that might lead to more
beneficial results.
I. WHY RANK STATE SUPREME COURTS?
Prior to the Choi, Gulati, and Posner study, the most prominent
rankings of state supreme courts were those issued by the United
9
States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber). The Chamber surveys
lawyers and asks them to evaluate the judicial impartiality, the
judicial competence, and the overall quality of state courts. The
rankings reward those courts that leading business lawyers perceive
10
as friendly to business.
The immediate positive result of Judicial Evaluations is that it
provides a counterbalance to the Chamber by demonstrating that a
high probusiness ranking does not equate to a high, objective quality
ranking. This contribution is not to be undervalued. One use of any
9. See, e.g., HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., 2008 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE
LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY (2008), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Superior%20Court/pdf/?harris_2008.pdf.
10. Id. at 20 tbl.7.
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judicial rankings system is political spin. As Professors Choi and
Gulati noted in their previous work, political actors consistently claim
11
that the judges they support are of the highest caliber and quality,
and they will no doubt be quick to cite a ranking system that supports
12
their claim if at all possible. Accordingly, it is also unsurprising that
rankings have also been used in debates over judicial salaries and
13
resources. Indeed because of their “ease of transmission and
14
understandability,” ranking systems have particularly powerful
15
resonance in the public mind. For this reason alone, offering an
objective alternative to the Chamber’s agenda-driven ranking system
is invaluable.
Beyond providing a weapon in the spin wars, however, the
16
benefits of ranking state supreme courts are not obvious. For
example, although the project of ranking federal appeals court judges
may make some sense as a method for determining the relative merit
of particular judges competing for a United States Supreme Court
17
nomination, the same rationale does not apply to comparing the
relative merits of state supreme courts. After all, seats on the United
18
States Supreme Court are filled by individuals, not full courts.
Nor does ranking state supreme courts accomplish the same
function as ranking institutions such as colleges, professional schools,

11. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 39 n.29.
12. To be sure, politicians might shy away from using a ranking system that may be seen as
too controversial or otherwise inconsistent with their agenda. A conservative, for example,
would likely not be inclined to cite a high ranking from the American Civil Liberties Union as
favorable evidence of a judge’s merit.
13. See Letter from Robert D. Ray, Iowa Judicial Comp. Task Force, to Nicholas Critelli,
President, Iowa State Bar Ass’n (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://www.iowabar.org/misc
documents.nsf/2b85a4ea12f4bfac8625669d006e27ab/f0fb92e322a9987d86256ff20049a0bb/$FILE/
Judicial%20compensation.pdf (cited in Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1316 n.2).
14. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 39 n.29.
15. See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. of Iowa News Serv., Study by UI Sociologist Shows Law
School Rankings Affect Student Decisions (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.newsreleases.uiowa.edu/
2006/march/030106law_study.html.
16. One reason for rankings suggested by the authors is to establish bragging rights. Choi et
al., supra note 1, at 1316–17. Perhaps a ranking system could be justified on that count alone.
But we are skeptical. The more likely uses of rankings are to (1) further policy or political
agendas or (2) decide on the allocation of resources to the court.
17. See Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 25–32.
18. Rankings, of course, could be used to compare the relative merits of state supreme
court judges but that would require individual rankings and not a ranking of the court as a
whole. In this respect, it is notable that Judicial Evaluation does not rank all individual state
court judges. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1360. Instead, it identifies judges that score
particularly well on certain measures. See id. at 1361 tbl.14.
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19

or hospitals. Those rankings influence the choices of prospective
patients, students, and faculty to affiliate with a particular
20
institution. The only equivalent of “applicants” to state supreme
courts are litigants. The aspect of judicial reputation of most interest
to the litigant, however, is the court’s sympathies for, or against, their
legal position—not whether that state’s supreme court is considered
21
by some measures to be objectively excellent.
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner suggest that ranking state
courts may assist individuals or entities that have an interest in the
influence of out-of-state courts. They claim that rankings may be
useful to individuals or entities who are affected by out-of-state
supreme court decisions because those parties then may have reason
to try to affect judicial composition in the highly ranked (and
therefore ostensibly more influential) states or they may want to
submit amicus briefs to influence the development of the law in those
22
states.
They further contend that lawyers, academics, and others who
conduct legal research may be especially interested in knowing which
court systems are seen as producing the best judicial opinions so they
23
can determine the best examples of legal reasoning. Finally, they
might suggest in this same vein that rankings could be beneficial
because a court in one state might follow a precedent from a highly
rated out-of-state supreme court over a decision of a lesser-ranked
state supreme court.
But these effects are likely to be marginal at best. The interests
of individuals or entities in out-of-state proceedings are likely to be
issue-dependent, not generic. For example, although labor law
19. See Special Report: America’s Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 7–14, 2008, at 46, 46; Special Report: America’s Best Graduate Schools:
Schools of Medicine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 7–14, 2008, at 36, 36–38; U.S. News &
World Report, America’s Best Hospitals, http://health.usnews.com/sections/health/besthospitals/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
20. See, e.g., Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S.
News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions Processes of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 105, 105 (2006) (finding that the U.S. News & World Report rankings “have significant
effects on both the decisions of prospective students and the decisions schools make in the
admissions process”).
21. For a discussion on the tendency of partisan elected state court judges to redistribute
wealth from out-of-state defendants, see Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of
Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341, 341 (2002). “[D]ifferences in
awards are caused by differences in electoral systems, not by differences in state law.” Id.
22. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1317–18.
23. Id.
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practitioners in one state may want to influence the development of
labor law in another state, it is unlikely that they will have enough
interest in that state’s legal system to also seek to influence that
state’s law in other substantive areas. Likewise, legal researchers are
likely to focus on cases in their substantive areas rather than on the
reputations of out-of-state courts in general. They will normally
investigate significant cases in their area of interest, regardless of
jurisdiction, and will not artificially confine their inquiries to highly
ranked judicial systems. Finally, a state supreme court seeking
support for its holdings from another jurisdiction will be far more
likely to be interested in the result of the case it cites than in the
24
reputation of the court that decides it. Indeed it is hard to believe
that a court faced with conflicting decisions from two different courts
would decide to follow one solely because the issuing court has a
superior reputation.
There is one area, however, in which the impact of judicial
rankings may be understated. Judicial rankings do not merely reflect
past performance of a judge or a court system—they might also create
25
incentives for a judge or court to take actions to improve their score.
If the ranking is used by the appointing authority—voters or
governors—to grade court performance, scoring well on the ranking
26
system will lead to job security and maybe even more resources.
And even if there are no tangible benefits to higher rankings, judges
may seek to score better in a ranking system simply because they
27
believe it will help improve their reputation and stature.
Accordingly, one reason to rank judges or courts would be to
influence behavior. As such, the stakes in judicial rankings are high
and the importance of getting it right and developing a system that
serves to encourage appropriate judicial behavior is manifest. The

24. Contrast this with the reputation of the judge who wrote the cited case. Sometimes, an
opinion will delineate which judge wrote the cited opinion to give the citation more authority.
This is especially true if a famous and influential judge wrote the opinion. See David Klein &
Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 371 (1999) (discussing the invocation of judges’ names in citations of
court opinions).
25. Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner recognize this. Indeed, it is one reason they
developed their ranking system. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, supra note 2, at 313–
15.
26. In the competition for state dollars, courts might spin rankings a number of ways. A
low-ranking court might attribute their rank or status to a lack of resources. A high-ranking
court might claim that they deserve more money precisely because they are so excellent.
27. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 627–31.
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question of whether the ranking system developed by Professors
Choi, Gulati, and Posner actually correlates to the estimable qualities
of a judge or a court is therefore of considerable consequence.
II. MEASURING JUDICIAL QUALITY
The question of what makes a good judge depends in no small
part on who is asking. To the Chamber, the question is easy—a judge
that lawyers perceive advance a probusiness agenda. Likewise, the
Sierra Club presumably considers a good judge to be one whose
opinions support environmental interests; organized labor considers a
good judge to be one whose jurisprudence furthers workers’ rights;
and the American Medical Association considers a good judge to be
one whose decisions limit tort awards for malpractice and otherwise
demonstrate solicitude for the concerns of physicians and other
medical professionals.
To a practicing attorney, the answer may be something different.
No doubt any attorney would be delighted to appear before a judge
who, for ideological reasons, is predisposed to rule in his favor. But
we are not convinced that all lawyers are so obsessively self-interested
that they would believe that simply because a judge might rule for
that lawyer’s side, that judge is thereby excellent. Moreover, in many,
28
if not most, cases ideology does not come into play. Thus, we suspect
that practicing lawyers would most value judges who are impartial,
clear, open-minded, fair, experienced, timely, and even-keeled in
29
judicial temperament.
The academic or expert observer, in turn, may be more focused
on qualities such as vision, creativity, writing quality, and scholarly
impact. Concededly, academics or experts may be influenced in their
appraisal by agreement with the judge on key issues, but they will also
be attuned to the judge’s knowledge of the law, ability to anticipate
the implications of the judge’s decisions, and intellectual honesty in
addressing opposing arguments. When Michael W. McConnell, a
prominent conservative, was nominated to the Tenth Circuit by
President George W. Bush, for example, he was supported by over a

28. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 27–28 (2008).
29. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 1 (2007) (calling for judges to
serve with impartiality, fairness, and to be “objective and open-minded”); id. 2.5 cmts. 1–4
(instructing judges to perform duties competently and diligently; to be efficient, punctual, and
prepared; and to avoid any “unnecessary cost or delay”).
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hundred legal scholars, including some of the most liberal academics
30
in the country, because of the strength of his scholarly contributions.
A president or governor, on the other hand, may view judicial
quality in still another light. The president or governor wants to
appoint a judge who shares a similar legal vision and who will use the
31
judicial role to advance the appointing agent’s political agenda. Yet,
the president or governor will also be alert to other factors such as
ethnic and geographic diversity and support from key constituencies
or political actors. More to the point for our purposes, the president
or governor is also likely, for both short-term and long-term reasons,
to want to appoint a jurist with high stature, meaning a reputation for
excellence among people of all political stripes. In the short term, the
appointment of a highly regarded jurist will improve the president or
the governor’s own political capital as the choice will be seen as
motivated by merit rather than politics. Further, establishing a
pattern of appointing highly regarded jurists may make for a
smoother confirmation of the president or governor’s subsequent
judicial nominees as an established track record of reputable
appointments means that each additional appointment might be
32
subject to less scrutiny.
Similarly, the president or governor will also have strong longterm interests at stake in nominating persons of stature. Appointing
governors or presidents will be interested in seating well-reputed
judges to establish their own legacy as someone who took
nominations powers seriously and worked to favorably influence the
administration of justice. The president or governor may also want to
appoint a jurist who has the vision and the ability to influence the law
for future generations.

30. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 707–35 (2002).
31. Attitudinalists might suggest that appointing someone sharing a similar legal vision is
simply an attempt to achieve favorable political results through judicial decisions. But the
equation is more complicated. A conservative governor, for example, is likely to choose to
appoint a conservative judge over a liberal candidate because they think the conservative judge
is right on the law. Conservative governors, then, choose judges based on what they believe to
be merit; the potential to obtain favorable political results through judicial decisionmaking is
not, in effect, anything more than a welcome by-product.
32. This is not to say that a president or governor will never appoint a judge because of
immediate political concerns. President George W. Bush, for example, may have nominated
Harriet Miers to the United States Supreme Court because he was particularly interested in
having a judge who strongly supported his positions on expansive presidential power.
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The ranking system set forth by Professors Choi, Gulati, and
Posner neither looks at case results nor reputation in defining what
33
constitutes a good court. They dismiss the former as inserting the
34
political component that an objective evaluation is designed to avoid
and they dismiss the latter because determining judicial reputation
would inevitably require surveying “experts” such as law professors
or bar organizations who may use surveys to advance their own
35
political agendas. Rather, the authors’ rankings look solely to who
scores well on the chosen proxies for productivity, influence, and
independence. And although the authors, to be sure, are aware that
reliance on these factors alone may omit other important aspects of
36
judicial behavior, their ranking system, in the end, weighs only these
three proxies.
We agree with the authors’ conclusion that neither interest
groups nor expert rankings provide objective assessments of judicial
performance. We are concerned, however, that the factors measured
in Judicial Evaluations are too narrow to be granted the presumptive
weight the authors suggest. Given the potential real-world impact of
this ranking system, it becomes necessary to investigate whether the
rankings in Judicial Evaluations actually work to reflect (and
promote) judicial quality. We turn to this task in the next Section.
III. THE CHOI, GULATI, AND POSNER MEASURES
It is not our purpose to raise every conceivable objection to the
methodology employed by the authors in Judicial Evaluations.
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner are refreshingly candid in

33. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320–26.
34. Id. at 1315–16 (“Because of the difficulty of identifying the principal’s preferences, we
cannot very easily evaluate judges on the basis of case outcomes.”).
35. Many scholars have critiqued the ABA’s ratings of judicial nominees. See, e.g., Bruce
Fein, Let’s Lower the ABA from Its Pedestal, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 28; see also James
Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for Political Bias, 1989–2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 2 (2001) (“In recent years, the ABA’s
role in rating judges has become increasingly controversial . . . .”); Laura E. Little, The ABA’s
Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to Give up on the Lawyers?, 10
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37–39 (2001) (“The ABA’s explicitly controversial positions have
surely contributed to its public relations problems and have magnified suspicions that the ABA
uses judicial evaluations to implement policy objectives under the whitewash of ‘judicial
fitness.’”); William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthesis,
57 ALB. L. REV. 993, 1026 (1994) (“The perception . . . has inspired criticisms of its prominent
role in the appointment process.”).
36. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320–26.
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recognizing potential methodological objections to their study and
they have been remarkably creative in striving to control for statespecific factors in compiling their results. Rather, our intent is to
critique Judicial Evaluations with a broader brush. Specifically we ask
three deliberately broad questions: (1) do the measures of
productivity, influence, and independence accurately assess judicial
quality; (2) does the data collected in the study create meaningful
proxies for these qualities; and (3) does ranking based on
performance on these measures encourage beneficial judicial
behavior?
A. Do Productivity, Influence, and Independence Reflect Judicial
Quality?
Although it obviously depends on how they are defined and
measured, we assume that productivity, influence, and independence
are positive judicial qualities. We suggest, however, that assessing
judicial quality by measuring these factors may not be particularly
fruitful and, perhaps, may be counterproductive.
Consider, for example, what types of judicial decisionmaking are
not captured by the study’s measures. As the authors acknowledge,
their study does not measure whether courts or judges decide cases
on the basis of policy preferences, although the authors themselves
37
suggest that deciding cases in that way is improper. Similarly, the
38
study does not pick up judicial corruption or malfeasance. Nor does
their study, in examining productivity, influence, and independence
alone, uncover the judicial behavior discussed in Professors Thomas
Brennan, Lee Epstein, and Nancy Staudt’s contribution to this
Symposium. That study suggests that judges at times act like voters
and punish or reward the government based on economic conditions
39
that may be extraneous to the legal issues before them. Therefore,
we wonder whether Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner’s study can
grant a presumptive marker of excellence or high quality if it allows a
court to maintain a high ranking even when its members decide cases
or behave in ways that the authors and most observers acknowledge

37. Id. at 1325.
38. Id. (discussing the fact that the study does not pick up instances of bribery).
39. See Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1194 (2009).
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are inappropriate. Equally significant, because of data limitations,
their study ignores aspects of judicial behavior that are arguably more
important than the ones proxied, such as integrity, fairness, openmindedness, thoroughness, and temperament. And it neglects the
contributions to the law that judges may make outside opinion
writing, including judicial administration and lower court supervision,
serving on government commissions, teaching at law schools, writing
scholarly articles, and training other judges. The data can only
provide so much information.
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, of course, recognize this
criticism and readily acknowledge that their measures “capture some,
41
but not all, aspects of judicial quality.” But they do not concede that
it is therefore misleading to focus rankings solely on their
performance measures. As noted, they argue that their rankings,
although not definitively capturing judicial quality, at least create a
presumption that courts that do well on their scores are superior to
those that do not. They state, “It would be a mistake to believe that
small differences in measured outcomes reflect significant differences
in quality. But where the differences are large, it is likely that the
lower-ranked judges or courts are inferior, unless a good reason exists
42
to explain the difference.” We are not convinced. If productivity,
influence, and independence represent only a narrow range on the list
of attributes that constitute a good judge or court, then creating a
presumption that a court that scores well on these factors is a high
quality court may be a classic example of the tail wagging the dog.
The authors strive to avoid this criticism by, in effect,
understating the impact of their work. They contend that because
their study only seeks to establish a presumption of judicial quality
rather than a full measure, anyone who disagrees with their results
can simply come forward and explain why a court that fares relatively
poorly on their measures should otherwise be deemed a quality court.
To the authors, the import of their study is in its effect as an

40. It might be argued that if a court’s decisions are too politically based they will not be
cited outside of that court’s jurisdiction and would therefore fare poorly on the influence
measure. That would only be true, however, if other courts were also not being swayed by
political concerns.
41. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1319.
42. Id. at 1319–20.
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“information-forcing” device. The political power inherent in
rankings, however, is not that nuanced. A claim by a court’s defender
that the results of a purportedly objective study should be discounted
because that court has chosen to devote its energies toward activities
that are outside the objective measures or that the court did not do
well in relation to other courts because of the idiosyncratic nature of
its caseload would have little political resonance and would simply
sound defensive. Similarly, because the public has little or no basis for
distinguishing between true and false claims about nonquantifiable
factors as reputation, stature, fairness, and judicial temperament, any
claim by a court’s defender arguing that the court’s poor performance
on the study’s rankings is outweighed by its excellence in these other
areas would sound hollow.
The compelling information in this political dialogue and the
information that, in Professors Choi and Gulati’s words, has the “ease
44
of transmission and understandability,” is the ranking number and
not the long excusatory explanation that follows. The study’s
objective rankings, in short, create a hard presumption that would be
extraordinarily difficult to rebut.
To all of this, one other important factor should be added. The
claim that the chosen proxies for productivity, influence, and
independence should presumptively trump other judicial qualities
requires, at the least, that those proxies are precisely measured. But
whether Judicial Evaluations accurately gleans productivity,
influence, and independence is a matter to which we now turn.
B. Does the Data Collected in Judicial Evaluations Accurately
Capture and Compare Productivity, Influence, and Independence?
1. Productivity. Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner purport to
capture productivity by counting the number of opinions issued by
each state supreme court. But whether the number of published
opinions should be equated to productivity depends in large part on
45
what goals the productivity measure is designed to serve. The

43. For a general discussion of the value of information-forcing devices, see Scott Baker,
Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing Device, 81 IND. L.J. 53, 78
(2006).
44. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 39 n.29.
45. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial
Performance, 32 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (2005) (suggesting that the productivity
measure does not clearly measure beneficial judicial behavior).
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authors argue that productivity is an important measure of judicial
quality because it reflects whether the courts are fulfilling their
46
obligation to resolve cases. But, in fact, as the authors acknowledge,
the relationship between publishing opinions and resolving cases is
not immediately apparent. Courts also resolve cases by issuing
unpublished opinions. Yet the authors do not credit these forms of
case disposition in their opinion counting, claiming that because
unpublished opinions are written by secondary personnel they do not
47
reflect the work of the court itself. Why not? If what is being
rewarded by the productivity measure is the court’s actions in
deciding cases, it should not matter how those cases are resolved.
The authors also defend the published opinions proxy on the
ground that written opinions allow judges to share their reasoning
with the parties and other judges thereby bettering the system of
48
justice. But more opinions do not necessarily lead to a better
jurisprudence. Multiple decisions on the same subject can often serve
49
to convolute, rather than clarify, legal rules. Authoring a single
opinion that provides a clear rule of decision may therefore be a more
productive use of judicial resources than writing multiple decisions on
the same subject.
Further, judges are productive in a variety of ways other than
merely increasing the quantity of opinions that they publish. In
addition to issuing unpublished opinions, courts may also devote
considerable time and resources to reading lengthy trial records, to
reforming judicial rules and practices, to supervising the state’s lower
courts, to writing scholarly articles, to training new judges, to
facilitating settlements, and to serving on government commissions.
None of these efforts are captured by the study’s productivity proxy.

46. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320–21.
47. Id. Presumably, the authors do not value productivity merely as a surrogate for hard
work. Hard work may be an admirable trait but it should not be relevant to a ranking system
unless it leads to results that benefit overall judicial quality. In any case, quantity of production
does not always equate to individual effort. A judge, after all, may work just as hard as another
but, for a variety of reasons, not be able to produce as much written work.
48. Id. at 1321.
49. See, e.g., Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547–49 (1997) (describing research costs
and judicial efficiency as rationales for not publishing all opinions); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1964, at 11 (1964) (recommending for the first time that opinions
be published only in cases “which are of general precedential value”).
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Finally, relying solely on the number of published opinions
ignores other key (and perhaps competing) proxies, such as timeliness
in deciding cases, that also reflect a court’s productivity. Consider two
courts. In a given year, Court A hears 300 cases. It writes opinions in
150 cases, with each opinion taking, on average, 100 days to formulate
and decides the other 150 by unpublished decisions, which take, on
average, 30 days each to formulate. Court B, in turn, hears 300 cases,
writes 50 opinions, and decides the other 250 cases by unpublished
decision. Which court is more productive? Court A writes more
opinions; so the authors’ study would give that court a higher rating.
50
But Court B’s speed of case disposition is much faster. Given the
51
importance of timeliness to the administration of justice, why should
52
not Court B be considered the more productive court?
2. Influence. The influence proxy employed by Professors Choi,
Gulati, and Posner is also problematic. Whether citation counts
generally measure influence or opinion quality has been the subject of
53
much debate, and we need not review that literature here. Even if
citation counts do shed some light on influence or quality, however,
they are just part of the picture. There is much more to opinion
quality than the number of judicial citations an opinion generates. A
landmark opinion in a relatively narrow area of law, for example, may
be cited less than a mediocre opinion in a frequently litigated
substantive area simply because there are fewer opinions generated in
54
that area. Or a court may write a groundbreaking opinion adopting a
minority approach to a legal issue; but that opinion will not yield
many citations if other states decide not to adopt the minority
approach.

50. On average Court B decides each case in 41.6 days; on average Court A decides each
case in 65 days.
51. We are reminded of the adage “Justice delayed is justice denied,” often attributed to
William Gladstone and made famous as a plea to courts to be efficient to administer justice
properly. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Judge Donald P. Lay, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1551, 1585 (2007) (praising Judge Lay’s speed and effectiveness in resolving cases).
52. Indeed, one of the problems inherent in the authors’ use of published opinions as a
proxy for productivity is that it discourages courts from issuing decisions quickly because writing
opinions takes more time.
53. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383,
1391–93 (2009); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence:
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272–75 (1998).
54. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 53, at 1392 (“[S]ome types of cases are simply more
common and therefore more likely to receive citations than other types of cases.”).
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Further, there are particularly strong reasons to question the use
of citation count for its accuracy in comparing influence or quality
across state systems. To begin with, we suspect that citations to outof-state courts are likely to come from the lawyers in the case, not
from in-state judges persuaded by the power of the reasoning of their
out-of-state colleagues. And, needless to say, the reasons that lawyers
cite out-of-state cases are also not primarily related to the strength of
the court’s reasoning. They choose to cite cases because they
welcome virtually any authority that supports their legal position.
Finally, high citation counts may be attributable to developments
in law unrelated to the strength of the judiciary. Citations to out-ofstate courts frequently occur when there is no case law on point in the
home jurisdiction, that is, when the legal issue in dispute is a matter of
first impression. This inevitably favors courts with innovative
legislatures, litigants, or state executives because those entities are
likely to trigger first-impression litigation and courts that rule first in
an area are likely to be more frequently cited, whether or not the
opinion itself is well reasoned.
3. Independence. A critical question regarding any independence
measure is “Independence from what?” The authors’ study examines
a judge’s independence by counting the number of times a judge
writes an opinion in opposition to another judge of his own party. As
one of us has previously argued, independence defined in this way
may actually measure a lack of quality in judging, including
deficiencies in collegiality and leadership, and a propensity for
55
judicial activism outside the ideological mainstream. Further,
dissenting opinions can also be harmful to the court’s general
administration of justice as they require a court to spend more time
and devote more resources to the case in question at the expense of
other cases.
Even more critically, the authors’ exclusive focus on intracourt
voting behavior in assessing independence ignores the nature of state
judicial selection processes. Unlike the federal court system in which
the judges enjoy life tenure, state court judges are generally subject to
reelection or reappointment and therefore need to have the political
support of governors, political parties, and contributors. The real tests
of a judge’s independence in the state courts, then, is more likely how

55. William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Problems with Empirical
Rankings to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 127–28 (2004).
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the judge responds to the pressures from these interests. After all, it
is governors, political parties, and contributors who, unlike fellow
judges, have the ability to affect a judge’s tenure and retention on the
bench. The authors’ study, however, does not measure how the judge
votes in relation to positions of these entities. As such, the authors’
proxy of counting the number of opinions a judge writes in opposition
to judges of their own party may not provide much insight into
57
judicial independence at the state court level.
C. Do the Authors’ Measures of Productivity, Influence, and
Independence Encourage Salutary Judicial Behavior?
As noted previously, ranking systems inevitably encourage their
subjects to engage in behavior that increases their scores. Thus,
Judicial Evaluations needs to be examined in this context as well—do
the measures used in the study encourage beneficial judicial
behavior? That is, would the quality of state courts be improved if the
courts issued more published opinions, worked to have their opinions
more widely cited out of state, and had judges more frequently write
opinions in opposition to others in their political party?
Although we have no doubt that some judicial observers might
believe that state court jurisprudence would be improved if judges
responded to these incentives, we are skeptical that many would find
that the major problems in state court jurisprudence are too few
opinions, too few out-of-state court citations, or too few dissents.
Rather, we suspect that observers would be more concerned that
judges too readily insert their policy preferences into their
58
59
decisions or are too beholden to political and special interests. But
as we have discussed, nothing in the authors’ study deters judges from
improperly inserting their policy preferences into their judicial
decisions or being unduly influenced by the policy agendas of their
56. See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J.
623 (2009) (demonstrating statistically that the views of donors and those who appoint judges
affect judges’ voting decisions).
57. On this point, it is notable that the authors’ independence findings do not correlate
with the Chamber surveys that ask lawyers to rate courts for judicial impartiality. See Choi et al.,
supra note 1, at 1355–59.
58. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection Versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
659, 661 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to
Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (1988).
59. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 591–95 (2002) (explaining that interest
groups may buy judge-made policy at the state level with campaign contributions).
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political patrons, financial supporters, or reappointing agents. Nor
do the incentives created by the authors’ measurements respond to
other frequent criticisms of the courts, including inefficient judicial
61
administration and long delays in deciding cases. Indeed, the study
places a premium on writing more published opinions and dissents,
which only exacerbates these problems. Thus, there is a significant
question as to whether the ranking system in Judicial Evaluations also
misses the mark by not creating a system of incentives that better
captures the elements of what should be encouraged and discouraged
in judicial behavior.
IV. CRAFTING A WIDER JUDICIAL RANKING LENS?
The fact that some problems can be identified in the Judicial
Evaluations methodology does not take any force away from its
authors’ observation that judicial rankings are here to stay. Nor does
it weaken their case that developing objective measures of judicial
quality would be beneficial in providing counterweights to competing
agenda-driven systems. It does suggest, however, that an alternative
lens for evaluating judicial performance needs to be developed.
The problem is that there are endemic weaknesses in any
ranking system. Objective measures such as the one employed by
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner inevitably miss essential
nonquantifiable aspects of judicial quality. The data are just not
sufficiently rich.
Expert evaluations are beset by their inherent subjectivity and
susceptibility to ideological bias. Agenda-driven surveys such as that
used by the Chamber do not, by definition, produce politically neutral
results.
We believe an ideal ranking system would serve two important
functions. First, it would provide necessary counterweight to agendadriven rankings, ideologically tinged expert evaluations, and efforts to
hide politically driven nominations behind claims of judicial
excellence. Second, an ideal ranking system would provide incentives
and disincentives for judicial behavior and accordingly would provide
a potentially valuable tool for improving judicial performance. A

60. See Shepherd, supra note 56, at 629 (“[U]nder some retention methods, judges’ voting
is associated with the political preferences of those who will decide whether the judges keep
their jobs.”).
61. On the value of speedy courts, see supra note 51.
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ranking system should, therefore, be adopted with these goals in
mind.
In this respect, we propose, perhaps counterintuitively, that a
better way to further these goals would be to first encourage multiple
interest groups to rank judges and then to examine who does well
across a wide range of subjective rankings. Although any particular
subjective evaluation may be unreliable, it may be possible to discern
important attributes by comparing different subjective evaluations
and taking into account the sources of those evaluations. If a court
has performed well in the Chamber study standing alone, for
example, this may simply reflect that commercial lawyers perceive
that court to be probusiness. But if that court also scores well with
organized labor, environmental organizations, and trial attorneys, the
rankings take on a different light. They suggest instead that the
court’s reputation derives from aspects of judicial performance that
transcend politics and ideology, perhaps including qualities such as
fairness, character, integrity, intellect, and efficiency.
At the same time, if a court ranks well with only the groups on
one side of the political spectrum, it sends precisely the opposite
message. A court that scores well with only one type of interest group
while earning failing marks from others is subject to the immediate
criticism that the court is only a shill for the interest group that has
evaluated it favorably. In this way, the fact that a court scores well
with a particular interest group can effectively be turned into a
political liability rather than an advantage. Multi-interest group
rankings can therefore provide effective counterspin to single interest
group rankings and provide counterweight to agenda-driven quality
claims.
Multi-interest group rankings also serve the goal of encouraging
beneficial judicial behavior because a judge, to improve their overall
rankings, will need to be favorably perceived across a broad spectrum
of interests. This motivation should encourage the judge to be, among
other things, fair, thoughtful, open-minded, tempered, and solicitous
of opposing views—to be, in short, a better judge.
To be sure, utilizing multi-interest group rankings is no panacea.
It is not clear, for example, how the rankings of the varying interest
groups should be solicited or cumulated, if at all. Nor is it
immediately apparent how the groups whose rankings are to be
considered in an overall appraisal should be identified. And any
cumulative ranking system will also raise inevitable questions of
balance. Does a cumulative ranking system that incorporates one
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survey each from environmental, labor, consumer, and business
interests reflect a balanced measure, or is it decidedly antibusiness
because three of those four groups would not be expected to be
particularly sensitive to business concerns?
Finally, a multi-interest group approach may also invite strategic
behavior. A liberal group may very well believe certain conservative
jurists are excellent judges, for example, but nevertheless give them
low scores to weaken those judges’ candidacy for judicial promotion.
Indeed, to the extent ratings are used in selecting Supreme Court
Justices, as Professors Choi and Gulati suggested in an earlier article,
strategic behavior of this type might quickly become the norm.
Nevertheless, we believe that expanding the field of avowedly
subjective judicial rankings may be a more effective mechanism for
evaluating judicial quality and for promoting beneficial judicial
behavior than a measure that too narrowly focuses on uncontestable
objective factors. And given that judicial rankings, for better or
worse, are unlikely to disappear, multigroup rankings may be the only
effective way to counter the political agendas of interest groups acting
on their own.
CONCLUSION
In their project, Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner tackle a
difficult task: ranking the state supreme courts on objective measures
for which data is readily available. They employ a transparent and
easy to understand methodology, attempting to measure judicial
productivity by counting a court’s number of published opinions,
judicial influence by counting out-of-state court citations, and judicial
independence by counting the number of opinions a judge writes in
opposition to another judge of her own political party. Recognizing
that productivity, influence, and independence alone do not fully
capture judicial quality, they suggest that performance on these
measures should set a presumption of judicial excellence that can be
rebutted by the inclusion of additional information to explain the
results. The rankings, as they see it, serve both to provide an initial
insight into judicial quality and an information-forcing device for
more complete appraisals.
Our response to the project is not the obvious one: Quality
cannot be measured so do not even try to grade the state courts.
Rather, recognizing, as the authors do, that, like it or not, judicial
rankings are here to stay, we pose a series of questions.
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Do most observers really care about productivity, influence, and
independence when it comes to state supreme courts? Or do they
care more about traits in judges that cannot be objectively measured
such as fairness and judicial temperament?
Even if observers do care about productivity, influence, or
independence, does scoring well on the proxies used by the authors in
measuring these qualities accurately measure excellence in the
attributes themselves? After all, the authors use only one proxy for
each attribute considered. Is the number of published opinions alone,
for example, an effective proxy for judicial productivity? Or would
using more proxies provide a better measure?
Can the presumption of quality triggered by the ranking
effectively be rebutted by counterclaims about the judicial qualities
undetected by the Choi, Gulati, and Posner framework? It may not
be enough that rankings will force information. They probably will.
The question is whether the information presented in response to the
rankings will actually be able to rebut the presumptions they create.
We do not believe they will.
Finally, do the measures encourage judges to act in a way that
enhances judicial quality? If not, as we suspect, then it may be that
the rankings will effectively undermine rather than improve judicial
performance.
In the end, perhaps it is best to admit that direct objective
evaluation is difficult here and that the better alternative is to
encourage more unabashedly agenda-driven rankings by interest
groups like the Chamber. First, because their motivations will
generally be clear, any weight given to these subjective rankings can
be discounted accordingly (as long as competing rankings are
available). Second, if a judge or court performs well across a wide
range of interest groups, it may provide meaningful and useful insight
about judicial quality that transcends the value of any appraisal
offered by one study alone.

